RECENT CASES
the counter-injunction might lead to such an impasse that proceedings under the act
would be suspended, and the entire situation reduced to a bickering over jurisdiction,
entirely unbecoming to the dignity of our judicial system.
Another solution to the problems presented in the principal cases, whether state
court injunctions are held valid or invalid, would of course be a redrafting of Section 56
to provide for suit against the defendant railroad in the district of the residence of the
defendant or in which the cause of action arose, or, if neither of these are suitable, in
the nearest convenient district in which the defendant shall be doing business at the
time of commencing such action. Or if the existing statute were construed as giving
the federal courts discretion to dismiss suits brought under the act, instead of making
the exercise of jurisdiction mandatory,23 a plea of forum non conveniens like that
which operates at civil law might also afford a solution.24

Procedure-Tolling of the Statute of Limitations-Foreign Corporation Ceasing to
Do Business within State-[Minnesota].-The plaintiff sued to recover the purchase
price on a sale of securities made illegal by the Minnesota Blue Sky Law.' The
defendant, a New York corporation, after the cause of action accrued, formally ceased
doing business in Minnesota. As a statutory qualification for selling securities in
Minnesota, it had irrevocably appointed the commissioner of securities as its agent
for service of process, 2 and in compliance with statutory provisions for withdrawing
from the state, it appointed the secretary of state its agent for service of process in
actions arising from business transacted in Minnesota.3 The statutory period for suing
on a liability created by statute had elapsed,4 and the defendant pleaded the statute
of limitations as a defense. The plaintiff demurred on the ground that the defendant
was "out of the state" within the meaning of the tolling provision of the statute of
limitationss and that in consequence the statutory period bad not "run." On appeal
23

Note 6 supra.

24Foster, The Place of Trial in Civil Actions, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 12X7 (1930); Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Anglo-American Law, 29 Col. L. Rev. i (1929).

xMinn. Stat. (Mason, 3927) § 3996-4. The statute requires certain securities to be registered before they are sold. The defendant sold such securities without registering them. The
plaintiff sued as one of the class of persons whom the statute was intended to protect and also
on a claim of fraud. The latter claim was not stressed at trial because the former was a sufficient basis for recovery if the plaintiff's action was not barred by the statute of limitations.
The sole question involved in this appeal, whether the statute of limitations had tolled, has
been an issue in nine cases, including the instant one, having similar fact situations and involving the interpretation of the same Minnesota statutes. City Co. of New York, Inc. v.
Stem, iio F. (2d) 6oi (C.C.A. 8th i94o); Chase Securities Corp. v. Vogel, iio F. (2d) 607
(C.C.A. 8th i94o); Shepard v. City Co. of New York, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 682 (Minn. X928);
Donaldson v. Chase Securities Corp., 296 N.W. 5i8 (Minn. i941). The other four cases in
lower state courts are unreported.
2Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 3996-l.
3 Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 7494.
4Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 919i. The statutory period during which the action must
be brought is six years. The cause of action in the instant case accrued in April 1929, and the
defendant withdrew from the state in August I934.

s Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) §9200.
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from an order sustaining the demurrer, held, that the defendant was not "out of the
state" within the meaning of the tolling provision and that the action was barred by
the statute of limitations. Pomeroy v. Nat'l City Co.6
While statutes of limitations are designed to obviate stale claims because of the
difficulty of evidentiary proof caused by a lapse of time,7 the tolling provisions in such
statutes recognize that a real availability for asserting the claim should exist for
the period of the running of the statute.8 The Minnesota statute in the instant
case provided for a tolling of the statute (i) if when the "action accrues against a person,
he is out of the state," or (2) if "after a cause of action accrues, he departs from and resides out of the state."9 Some courts have construed similar provisions as preventing application of the statute of limitations to a foreign corporation, even though it is "doing
business" within the state, because it is not a "resident" or a "person" within the
state.'0 This interpretation has been upheld by the Supreme Court of the United
States as not discriminating unreasonably against foreign corporations." The Minnesota court, however, has adopted the more widely held view that a foreign corporation
"doing business" within the state may use the statute of limitations as a defense.!2
The instant case raises the more difficult problem of whether a foreign corporation
which has ceased "doing business" in the state is "out of the state" within the meaning
of the tolling provision. In construing such provisions most courts have held that the
statute of limitations does not toll where substituted service will obtain jurisdiction
sufficient for a personal judgment against a resident defendant who has temporarily
left the state.' 3 The court in the present case employed this test and based its decision
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i Wood, Limitation of Actions § 5 (Moore's ed. I916).

Cases cited in note 13 infra; Tolling The Statute of Limitations During the Debtor's Absence, 46 Harv. L. Rev. 7o6 (1933).
9Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 9200. Nearly every state has a tolling provision in its statute
of limitations and most of them contain approximately the same provisions. See for example,
Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1937) § 351; Iowa Code (i939) § 11013; Me. Rev. Stat. (1930)
c. 95, § iio; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, 1938) § 27.609; Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1925) art. 5537; Tolling The Statute of Limitations During the Debtor's Absence, 46
Harv. L. Rev. 7o6 (I933).
o0Williams v. Metropolitan Street R. Co., 68 Kan. 17, 74 Pac. 600 (i9o3); State v. Nat'l
Accident Society of New York, 103 Wis. 208, 79 N.W. 220 (1899); Barstow v. Union Consolidated Silver Mining Co., xoNev. 386 (1875); Rathbun v. Northern Central R. Co., 5o N.Y. 656
(x872). But cf. Comey v. United Surety Co., 217 N.Y. 268, I1 N.E. 832 (i916) (insurance
company allowed to plead statute of limitations). Kansas, New York and Wisconsin have
amended their tolling provisions in an attempt to modify such strict interpretations. Kan. Gen.
Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) § 6o-3og; N.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, Supp. i94o) § i9;
Wis. Stat. (1939) § 330.30.
" Tioga R. Co. v. Blossburg & C. R. Co., 20 Wall. (U.S.) 137 (1873).
2St. Paul v. Chicago, M. &St. P. R. Co., 45 Minn. 387,48 N.W. 17 (i89i); McLaughlin v.
Aetna Life Ins. Co., 221 Mich. 479, 191 N.W. 224 (1922); Huss v. Central Railroad and Banking Co., 66 Ala. 472 (r88o); Pennsylvania Co. v. Sloan, r Ill. App. 364 (1878); Lawrence v.
Ballou, 50 Cal. 258 (1875).
13Clegg v. Bishop, io5 Conn. 564, 136 Atl. 102 (1927); Crowder v. Morphy, 6r Wash. 626,
112 Pac. 742 (I911); State ex rel. Shipman v. Allen, 132 Mo. App. 98, iii S.W. 622 (19o8);
Nunez v. Taylor, gr Ky. 461, i6 S.W. 128 (i89x); Quarles v. Bickford, 64 N.H. 425, r3 Atl.
642 (1888); Rutland Marble Co. v. Bliss, 57 Vt. 23 (i886); State v. Furlong, 6o Miss. 839
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on the fact that a state official was named by statute an agent for service of process
on the defendant corporation.4 Under this construction, the statute would toll only as
to natural persons actually residing out of the state and having no agent for service
in the state. Consequently, such a statute would not toll as to non-resident automobile
drivers in states having laws appointing a state official as agent for service of process
on these drivers.'s
In City Company of New York v. Stern, 6 relied upon by the dissenting judge in the
instant case, the view was taken upon a strict construction of the Minnesota statute
that the corporation had departed from and no longer "resided" within the state. This
appeared to make doing business within the state the prerequisite for the running of
the statute of limitations.7 The test is thus analogous to the physical presence test
used by a minority of courts in cases involving residents temporarily absent or nonresident drivers. 8 As a result of this approach a claim against the defendant corporation might be prosecuted at any time in the future, despite the fact that the withdrawal
statute clearly presupposes that such claims will at some time be cut off,19 and despite
the policy of the statute of limitations. In the Stern case emphasis was placed on the
fact that the statutory agent was appointed by means of a "contract" between the
state and the foreign corporation for the benefit of the citizens of the state and not for
the benefit of the corporation.o But this fact should have no bearing on an interpretation of the tolling provision, which was intended to protect plaintiffs who, through no
fault of their own, could not reduce a claim to judgment within the statutory period
allowed. If the plaintiff can obtain a judgment, however, there is no reason for tolling
the statute.
(x883); Blodgett v. Utley, 4 Neb. 25 (r875); Penley v. Waterhouse, x Iowa 498 (1885); Buchnam v. Thompson, 38 Me. 171 (185). See note 18 infra for cases contra.
Z4Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) § 7494. Ohio and Oklahoma have used this test in cases involving fact situations similar to the instant one. Title Guaranty and Surety Co. v. McAllister,
z3o Ohio St. 537, 2oo N.E. 831 (1936); Walker v. Meyers Construction Co., 175 Okla. 548,
53 P. (2d) 547 (1936); cf. Nelson v. Richardson, 295 Ill. App. 504, i5 N.E. (2d) 17 (1938)
(non-resident driver); Arrowood v. McMinn County, x73 Tenn. 562, 121 S.W. (2d) 566 (1938)
(non-resident driver).
15Nelson v. Richardson, 295 Ill. App. 5o4, 15 N.E. (2d) 17 (2938); Arrowood v. McMinn
County, x73 Tenn. 562, 12 S.W. (2d) 566 (1938); Coombs v. Darling, 116 Conn. 643, x66 Atl.
70 (1933).
6 o F. (2d) 6ox (C.A.A. 8th x94o). This case was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court on March 32, 1941, on the basis of the Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in the Pomeroy case. 61 S. Ct. 823 (942).
X7 City Co. of New York, Inc. v. Stem, zio F. (2d) 6oi, 603, 6o4 (C.C.A. 8th 294o).
x8Roth v. Holman, 2o5 Kan. 175, 182 Pac. 416 (2929); Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51
Utah 227, i69 Pac. 954 (3917); Anthes v. Anthes, 22 Idaho 3o5, 12 Pac. 553 (2912); Parker v.
Kelley, 61 Wis. 552, 21 N.W. 539 (2884); Maguire v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 253 App. Div. 249,
x N.Y.S. (2d) 749 (938), aff'd 278 N.Y. 576, 16 N.E. (2d) 220 (2938) (non-resident driver);
Bode v. Flynn, 223 Wis. 509, 252 N.W. 284 (2934) (non-resident driver).
19"Such appointment of said agent shall continue in force as long as any cause of action,
right, or claim against said corporation survives in this state." Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927)
§ 7494. See Pomeroy v. Nat'l City Co., 296 N.W. 513, 516 (Minn. 1942); dissent in City Co.
of New York, Inc. v. Stem, ino F. (2d) 60x, 606 (C.C.A. 8th i94o).
2o City Co. of NewYork, Inc. v. Stem, i2o F. (2d) 6oi, 6o4 (C.C.A. 8th 294o).
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A more desirable solution would require revision of the tolling provisions in the
light of modem procedural methods. The New York tolling provision has been
amended to provide that the statute of limitations will run if the defendant has designated "in pursuance of law ....a resident of the state on whom a summons may be
served. ''2z Although this section applies to persons and corporations, it does not seem
to be sufficiently specific, for the New York court has held, in a non-resident driver2
case, that the agent must be one voluntarily appointed and not one named by statute
Taxation-Tax on Apple Growers-Use of Proceeds for Advertising of State-grown
Apples-[Michigan].-In i939 the State of Michigan, anxious to promote the sale of
home-grown apples, passed the "Baldwin Apple Act" providing for a tax upon the
producers of Michigan apples, the proceeds from which were to be used to set up a
commission with the sole task of advertising Michigan apples., The complainant,
representative of a group of disgruntled apple growers, sought to enjoin enforcement of
the statute on the ground that it was an unconstitutional discrimination and that it
was, in addition, a tax levied for a private rather than a public purpose. The lower
court upheld these contentions. On appeal by the state to the Michigan Supreme
Court, held, that the singling out of apple growers for the imposition of a specific
tax is not discriminatory and that apple growing in Michigan is an industry sufficiently
invested with a public interest to be the beneficiary of a tax. Judgment reversed. Miller
v. Michigan State Apple Corn'i.
The least troublesome of the issues concerns the power of the legislature to classify
for taxation purposes. The Michigan constitution authorizes specific taxes and provides only that they shall operate uniformly upon the class designated.3 There is no
question that the tax in the principal case operated uniformly upon the class of Michigan apple-growers.4 Moreover, the instances are infrequent in which a legislature's
classification for tax purposes has been the basis of invalidation.5 Michigan specific
taxes upon heirs,6 chain stores, 7 employment agencies, 8 drivers of vehicles,9 and sellers
of liquor xo have been declared constitutional.
2XN.Y. Civ. Prac. Ann. (Gilbert-Bliss, Supp. i94o) § ig.
-Maguire v. Yellow Taxi Corp., 253 App. Div. 249, i N.Y.S. (2d) 749 (1938), aff'd 278
N.Y. 576, 16 N.E. (2d) 110 (1938).
I Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, Supp. i94o) § 12.1220. The amount of the tax was one
cent upon each bushel or two cents upon each one hundred pounds, payable when shipped.
§ 12.1220(9).

N.W. 245 (Mich. 1941).
"The legislature may by law impose specific taxes, which shall be uniform upon the
classes upon which they operate." Mich. Const. art. 1o, §4.
4 Apples sold directly to cider and/or vinegar plants were exempt; each grower might produce three hundred bushels each year tax free. Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, Supp. 194o)
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7Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 259 N.W. 352 (I935).
8Brazee v. People of Michigan, 241 U.S. 340 (igi6).

9Jasnowski v. Board of Assessors, 191 Mich. 287, 157 N.W. 891 (r916).
xoPeople v. Palasz, ig' Mich. 556, 158 N.W. 166 (i916).

